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1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and outline of report 
The report addresses governance issues in post-war situations as these are dealt with in 
three sets of literature. First, there is a growing case-based knowledge arising from the 
experience in internationally-assisted transitions from war to peace since the early 1990s. 
Second, insofar as these transitions typically intended to establish a democratic post-war 
order, important insights can be drawn from the more general literature on democratic 
transitions. Finally, there is increasing evidence that the direction of developments in the 
post-war phase in important ways is shaped not only by the conflict itself, but by the 
nature of the peace settlement and the international commitment to the agreement and its 
implementation (Cousens, Stedman, and Rothchild 2002; Hampson 1996). As a result, 
the context of political and economic reconstruction will vary significantly.  
 
As the report is concerned with the fit between a post-war context and the 
implementation of a democratic system of governance, it starts by briefly outlining key 
institutional components of such a system. After noting the importance of differentiating 
between types of post-war situations, the report reviews experiences from what is 
considered to be the most critical governance interventions. These include constitution-
making and constitutional design; establishment of watchdog institutions; truth 
commissions and criminal justice procedures; local governance; security sector reform; 
elections, forming of electoral systems and political parties; supporting human rights 
organisations; empowerment projects, and cooperation among divided communities and 
peace committees. Lastly, major cross-cutting issues are considered, such as pace, 
sequencing and portfolio mix of governance interventions, building trust and generating 
reconciliation, and coordination of external actors.  
1.2 Terminology: ‘post-war’ 
A clarification of terminology is important at the outset. ‘Post-conflict’ is a misleading 
term, not only because conflict is an inherent element in all societies, but because 
violence often continues in societies after a peace settlement has been accepted (Macrae 
1999). Such violence – whether politically motivated (as in Afghanistan) or manifested 
mainly as common crime (Guatemala) – is a major obstacle to good governance in a 
broad sense. In Guatemala, for instance, it is estimated that the number of violent deaths 
in the first five years after the peace agreement was about the same as the annual average 
during the war (Pearce 1999). The combination of a violent reality with the non-violent 
implications of the language used by the international aid agencies can produce serious 
distortions in the recognition of problems and expectations of solutions. For instance, 
would agencies that operate in a ‘post-conflict society’ and within ‘post-conflict 
programs’ readily select projects designed to reduce violence? Programmatic emphasis 
on ‘rule of law’ captures only a small dimension of the violence problem. A heroic effort 
to overcome definitional obstacles of this kind was reflected in the title of a recent paper 
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on post-war Guatemala: “Violence in the Guatemalan Post-Conflict Society. ” (Prophette 
2002-03).  
 
In the interest of clarity, the term ‘post-war’ rather than ‘post-conflict’ will be used in this 
report.  
1.3 Democratic governance: basic concepts 
Democratic accountability is a prerequisite for good governance and a functioning 
democratic system. To secure that political leaders ‘play by the rules’ – act in accordance 
with their mandate and do not violate citizens’ rights – is a concern in all societies aiming 
to secure a democratic form of government.  
 
Accountability divides into two analytically distinct categories:  
(i) Horizontal accountability refers to the classical tripartite division of state power 
between the three branches of government as well as the range of other public 
entities (often called special agencies of restraint or ‘watchdogs’) created to check 
the abuse or inefficiencies of state.  
(ii) Vertical accountability denotes the chain of institutions and processes that link 
the elected ruler to its electorate and the citizens. It includes citizens acting 
through the electoral process or indirectly via civic organizations and the media. 
 
Figure 1. Institutions of accountability 
 
 
* The type and number of special institutions of restraint vary between countries, but such institutions may 
include a supreme auditing institution, anticorruption agency, ombudsman institution, human rights 
commission, public appointments authority, independent electoral commission and media board.  
** The legislature stands out since it has an accountability relationship to both the executive (horizontal 
accountability) and the electorate (vertical accountability) and thus may be seen to represent some kind of 
hybrid accountability.  
Political 
parties  
Government Judiciary 
Watchdog agencies* 
NGOs 
CSOs 
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”The People” 
Parliament** 
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A third form of accountability can be added, namely the accountability imposed by 
external agents such as donors, financial institutions, etc. A general institutional pattern is 
outlined in Figure 1, indicating the different institutions of accountability and their direct 
or indirect accountability relationship to the executive.  
1.4 Post-war situations: three types  
While general formulas have some use, policy prescriptions based on a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
type can be quite misleading. The recent World Bank study (2003) on development and 
conflict (Breaking the Conflict Trap) introduces one such policy formula for post-war 
situations. It has three clear recommendations: (i) introduce international peacekeeping 
forces in the early phase to stabilize the peace, (ii) gradually phase in financial aid to peak 
in the mid-first decade of peace, when absorptive capacity is optimal for growth, to 
produce a growth spurt that can sustain the peace, and (iii) lastly, towards the end of the 
decade, introduce democratic institutions. The timing of (iii) is explained with reference 
to the conflictual-competitive aspect of democracy and the potential instability of a 
democratic transition. The assumption is that stability-generating economic growth must 
first take place.  
 
The World Bank conclusion is based on aggregate data analysis and selective use of the 
qualitative literature. As for (iii), the recommendation to introduce democratic institutions 
late in the sequence of ‘post-conflict’ measures is supported by (and partly derived from) 
the widely cited lessons from Bosnia, where early elections favoured extremist political 
forces.  Yet exactly the opposite conclusion is widely considered a principal lesson from 
East Timor: democratic institutions should be introduced as soon as possible after the war 
ends.  
 
Both conclusions are valid, but for different situations. Let us illustrate by sketching 3 
types of post-war situations based on the outcome of the war and the nature of the peace 
agreement.  
 
(a) Self-enforcing peace building  
The war is fought to a decisive victory, with the defeated party often territorially 
displaced. As a result, there is considerable consensus on the constitutive issues of the 
post-war order. Civil wars that end with successful separation fall in this category (East 
Timor, and earlier Eritrea). The successor authority typically has strong claims to rule and 
institute what it considers relevant democratic and legitimizing structures. From this 
perspective, early rather than late introduction of democratic institutions is preferable. 
The role of the international aid community is essentially secondary and supportive in 
relation to cementing the peace (hence “self-enforcing”). 
 
(b) Mediated peace building  
The war is fought to a standstill and ends with a compromise. The modalities of the post-
war transition are incorporated in the peace agreement, which represents at least a 
minimal consensus on constitutive issues for the nature of the post-war order.  Yet mutual 
distrust remains, the agreement is fragile, spoilers may be waiting in the wings, and the 
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protagonists maintain their respective military forces. Bosnia, Mozambique and 
Cambodia are cases in point. In such situation, sustained and focused international 
attention is critical to maintain the momentum of the peace process (hence “mediated 
case”). Implementation of governance measures as provided for in the agreement must be 
assessed in relation to the uncertain peace and key elements of the agreement. It may well 
be advisable to delay elections until the peace process is affirmed. In some cases, 
however, elections may constitute a critical mechanism for the transition from war to 
peace (e.g. in Mozambique, where elections were the vehicle for getting Renamo “out of 
the bush”).  
 
(c) Conflictual peace building  
The war ends with military victory of one side, but the peace settlement does not 
incorporate the defeated party and/or the populations associated with it. Many original 
causes of the conflict are unresolved and there is no authoritative framework for what 
should be the basis for rebuilding society.  Afghanistan (post-Taliban) is a case in point. 
In this type of situation, conflict is embedded in the post-war situation and the concept of 
‘post-conflict’ is misleading. Addressing the unresolved political issues is critical to 
improve both security and conditions for economic recovery. No easy or ready-made 
formulas suggest themselves, except for one process rule: The choice of governance 
interventions need to be informed by their likelihood to impact on the unresolved political 
conflicts.  
 
The typology is not exhaustive, and some cases will not fit easily in any box. The 
categorization nevertheless encourages policy measures that are sensitive to the type of 
situation where they are applied. 
2. Lessons from governance interventions 
in post-war situations 
 
Strengthening horizontal accountability in a post-war context typically involves 
interventions and external support in the following areas: constitution-making, watchdog 
institutions, transitional justice, local governance, and security sector reform. 
2.1 Constitution-making and constitutional design 
New constitutions have been promulgated in some post-war situations, and the results are 
mixed. At its best, constitution-making can generate social consensus on constitutive 
issues and simultaneously serve as a healing process in deeply divided societies. At its 
worst, it can be a quick-fix legitimacy exercise that gives the incumbent a thin veil of 
legitimacy but remains a dead letter – an instrument that is abused or ignored – and 
thereby discredits the democratic process itself. The critical factors in this regard are time 
and how the constitution is made (Hart 2003). Conflictual post-war situations require 
comprehensive, slow and cautious processes; this is less important in the self-enforcing 
cases.  
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The constitution-making in South Africa is widely regarded as a model for divided 
societies, whether emerging from conventional civil wars or other forms of violent 
conflict. The process took altogether almost seven years (1989-1996), and faced threats 
of renewed violence. It was a participatory deliberative process involving private and 
public negotiations, and a comprehensive educational campaign was run in parallel. The 
slow and cumbersome nature of the process was at the heart of its success.  
 
Three recent cases where the international community has supported post-war 
constitution-making depart sharply from the South African model. In Rwanda, 
Afghanistan and East Timor, the constitutional process was rapid, involving limited 
negotiations with the parties concerned and mostly pro forma public participation.  
 
· In Rwanda the main phase of the constitution-making was implemented in 2002 
and completed in May 2003 by a referendum.  Planned in detail by the RPF 
government that came to power after the 1994 genocide, the process invited 
public participation even before a constitutional text was drafted. The resultant 
document is widely considered a ‘victor’s constitution’ and did little to heal the 
enormous gulf between the Hutu and the Tutsi communities.  
· In Afghanistan the constitution-making process was railroaded through in less 
than one year. There was international pressure to meet the timetable specified in 
the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 and it was hoped that a new constitution 
would give legal legitimacy to the foreign- installed and foreign-financed 
government of president Karzai. While the process entailed some give-and-take 
among the political parties – and the use of the traditional loya jirga mechanism 
did confer some legitimacy – there was considerable concern that the process was 
manipulated and that it swept under the rug the country’s deep social and political 
divisions. A historic opportunity to generate greater consensus through 
deliberation was lost. 
· The constitution-making process in East Timor was also quick, lasting only about 
one year. It was driven by the Timorese desire to assume sovereign authority over 
their own affairs and by the UN’s concern to terminate its costly, direct 
administration of the territory. In the East Timorese case, however, the speed and 
perfunctory public participation mattered less as the process unfolded against the 
backdrop of considerable social consensus.  
 
Research on constitutional design in emerging democracies suggests that parliamentary 
democracy is preferable to presidentialism insofar as the latter tends to foster zero-sum 
competition, deadlock and personalistic leadership. While disputed as a general rule 
(Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Von Mettenheim 1997), it remains particularly relevant 
for divided societies and thus post-war situations of the conflictual kind. Parliamentarism 
appears as the optimal system for managing conflict in a democratic framework because 
it includes rather than excludes and encourages compromise and coalitions (Lijphart 
1994; Linz 1994).  
 
In reality, parliaments in ‘new democracies’ have fallen far short of that ideal (Gyimah-
Boadi 1991; Kingham 2003). Working in the shadow of executive dominance they appear 
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instead as instruments for ‘negative coalitions’ designed to gain power and are unable to 
generate enduring popular support. The situation of countries that emerged from civil 
violence after the Cold War does not seem materially different. None embraced pure 
parliamentarism, and most have strong presidential systems. In most cases, this was a 
carry-over from the pre-war system. Others adopted presidential systems in connection 
with constitutional change; in the case of Afghanistan, this also reflected external interest 
in a strong executive that could serve as a reliable ally.  
2.2 Introducing watchdog institutions  
The concept of ‘watchdog institutions’ appeared with the emergence of the ‘new 
democracies’ in former socialist states and one-party states in the South. The watchdogs 
were intended to complement other institution of restraint on the state (parliament, civil 
society, courts, etc). The concept is relevant to several kinds of post-war situations. 
 
· ‘Rights watchdogs’ are critical where the state has been associated with 
exceptional violence (particularly against civilians and suspected enemies) and 
where some of alleged violators remain in positions of power (e.g. in Guatemala 
and  Afghanistan). National human rights commissions have become a typical 
feature of post-war settlements, and some have the international high- level 
support that facilitates their work without endangering the lives of their members. 
 
· ‘Reform watchdogs’ have been established to oversee implementation of peace 
agreements that entail reforms of the state administration – particularly army, 
police and the legal system – and prescribe a political transition involving 
elections and/or constitution-making. Reforms of this kind touch basic issues of 
power in post-war society, and even concerted attention from the international 
community may not enable the watchdogs to do more than bark (e.g. Bosnia and 
Mozambique). 
 
· ‘Audit watchdogs’, such as audit institutions and anticorruption commissions, 
were a feature of some of the ‘new democracies’ designed to ensure 
accountability in state economic management (Gloppen and Rakner 2004). They 
have not been a characteristic ingredient of post-war governance measures, 
although there is a strong rationale for including them.   
 
Corruption is typically prevalent in societies where there is limited accountability of 
public institutions. In post-war situations where the state is contested or the institutions of 
accountability weak, the potential for corruption is considerable. Large inflows of aid 
money and the residue of an illegal war economy magnify the problem. Corruption 
during the post-war reconstruction in Bosnia was legendary. In Afghanistan, the 
government has resorted to hiring expensive international auditing firms to ensure donors 
that it can handle large aid flows. National audit commissions may be a more appropriate 
step, although they cannot be a complete solution to a problem that is structural in nature. 
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2.3 Establish truth commissions and criminal justice procedures 
A survey of 27 countries that have had truth commissions or criminal justice proceedings 
involving massive human rights violations shows that most have chosen commissions, 
and some have had both. Some have experienced renewed violence, but not necessarily 
for reasons relating to the fact or form of accountability processes for past violence (see 
Annex II). We do know, however, that demands for justice can refuse to fade over time: 
in Argentina, courts are now reopening prosecution against human rights violations 
allegedly committed by the military over 20 years ago (Skaar 2004). 
 
The reasons why countries react differently to questions of transitional justice are also 
reasonably well known. International criminal tribunals are adopted when this suits the 
strategic interests of the large powers (hence used for the former Yugoslavia and, for 
minimal consistency, also in Rwanda), but not in East Timor (opposed by the US) or for a 
long time in Cambodia (opposed by China). Mixed tribunals at lower cost are being tried 
with some promise of success in Sierra Leone. Another variation is a combination of 
national with international courts, including traditional legal procedures (the much-
discussed gacacas in Rwanda).  
 
National responses to transitional justice are primarily determined by the outcome of the 
conflict. When the violence ended with a compromise settlement, truth commissions tend 
to prevail, when the conflict ended with a clear victory and defeat, legal proceedings tend 
to be used. 
2.4 Promoting local governance 
A decentralized approach is commonly held to be particularly important in post-war 
contexts where central governing structures are weak or remain contested. Local 
structures then become critical for providing goods and services, particularly for 
vulnerable groups, and to promote local-democratic processes. Experts nevertheless warn 
that no activities at the local level will succeed in the long run without a national state 
structure (Woodward 2002).  
 
Design and political motivations are important factors determining the effect of 
decentralization and local governance programs. Central- local (or regional) relations are 
typically sensitive and may be complicated by hidden agendas. Paradoxically, perhaps, 
the central government may use formal programs of decentralization to enhance its 
control on the local level, e.g. Museveni’s transformation of the Resistance Councils in 
Uganda, and the National Solidarity Program of the Karzai-administration in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the central government hoped to establish ties of allegiance 
with local communities by distributing bloc grants to the villages, thereby bypassing mid-
level ‘warlords’. In Cambodia, the struggle over district- level administrative offices is 
seen as contributing to Hun Sen’s coup of July 1997.  
 
Externally initiated programs of decentralization must be particularly carefully designed 
if they are going to work. In Somalia, UNOSOM II pursued a “bottom-up” strategy to 
establish district and regional councils that would elect members to the national 
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transitional government. The councils were to seen as a democratic counterforce to the 
‘warlords’. In practice, however, the district councils became empty shells largely devoid 
of authority, mainly because the Somali warlords and other leaders preferred a “top-
down” approach. In Bosnia, the system imposed at Dayton turned out to be overly 
decentralized and reproduced the structural faults of the former system. The coalitions of 
regional authorities impaired effective central governance and at the lowest level the 
mesne zajednice were replaced by new local institutions. The overall result has, among 
other things, been a decrease in the quality of service delivery and mono-ethinc 
dominance of local power (Woodward 2002).    
 
Community Driven Development projects (CDD) have generally been effective in 
establishing or expanding essential social services and physical infrastructure at the local 
level. On the other hand, poor and socially excluded groups often have difficulties in 
responding to the opportunities created by CDD-type projects. Established authorities 
may prevail, or even be strengthened with the infusion of new funds. The experience with 
regard to the role of women is mixed. Including women in community-based 
organizations in Rwanda worked generally well, while less so in Indonesia (Strand 2003). 
Addressing the needs of vulnerable or less privileged groups may often require more 
targeted and supply-driven approaches. Applying the model to post-war situations entails 
particular challenges if villages have been divided or if resources are distributed 
unequally among previously hostile areas. Giving the communities new resources to 
dispose of under such conditions can generate new conflict unless appropriate structures 
of cooperation and reconciliation are established. Experiences from Indonesia and 
Afghanistan show that frameworks for dispute mediation at the local level may bring 
together divided societies.  
 
The underlying rationale for CDD is not merely service delivery, but democratic 
empowerment. Precisely to avoid the possibility that established authorities will make use 
of the funds to entrench themselves, requirements for local elections accompany the 
distribution of CDD-type money.  As of yet, there is not enough systematic data to draw 
firm conclusions regarding the empowerment effect of CDD projects in this regard. Initial 
evaluations in East Timor and Afghanistan have been mixed.  
2.5 Reforming the security sector  
The concept of security sector reform (SSR) emerged in the late 1990s as a first major 
attempt among donor agencies to formulate a coherent policy approach to security issues 
and security institutions. The security sector was broadly defined to include institutions of 
police and justice, defence (private and public military organizations), and civilian 
control and oversight (Tjønneland 2003 and Brzoska 2003).   
 
SSR usually has two tasks: (i) reform security institutions in order to increase their 
effectiveness, and (ii) ensure that these institutions are governed in accordance with the 
principles of democracy and civilian oversight. 
 
There is no fully shared international understanding of approaches required to assist 
security reforms. Development agencies define and approach security work in keeping 
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with their differing institutional mandates, organisational priorities and administrative 
constraints. In several donor countries, other agencies – such as the military and the 
police – have become instrumental in formulating and implementing SSR-policies with 
aid agencies playing a minor role. The UK’s support for SSR in Sierra Leone is reported 
to have effectively combined military training, development and diplomatic activitie s 
designed to create an enabling environment for reform and to address technical and 
financial needs. DFID has been in charge of the funding of the reform component while 
the Ministry of Defence has been responsible for support and training of the new army 
(OECD/DAC 2001).   
 
The major cases of externally assisted reform of the security sector are probably in 
Central and South Eastern European countries, including the Balkans. The EU, NATO 
and OSCE have been critical in applying pressure and incentives, as well as assisting the 
restructuring of security sector elements of applicant states and in transitional societies. A 
main example is the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe where security sector reform 
has become a main focus (Woodward 2003). There are few experiences of 
comprehensive security sector reform in the South (Cawthra and Luckham 2003).  
 
The most cited success cases are South Africa and some Latin American countries. The 
process here was to a large extent home-grown and driven by domestic actors, thus 
underlining the importance of participation to create legitimacy. Transforming the 
defence sector in South Africa has taken more than 8 years and is still not completed. Six 
drafts of the South African White Paper on Defence were prepared for comment by 
military officers, parliamentarians and members of the public. Its finalisation took 18 
months and the following consultative Defence Review just as long. In Guatemala, a 
UNDP supported project for dialogue on defence issues has helped to create the needed 
political space within society to discuss military reform (UNDP/Guatemala 2001). 
 
Finding appropriate entry points to SSR are important. In Uganda, the UK used Uganda’s 
Defence Review as an entry point by broadening the review process to include other 
security actors and concerns than those of national defence strictly speaking. PRSPs 
might also function as participatory frameworks for SSR. In Cambodia, the non-
governmental community has incorporated various security issues in its submission to the 
PRSP process. In Guatemala, however, the military has not been sufficiently included in 
this process, and overall the experience of using PRSPs to promote SSR has been 
disappointing (INTRAC 1996).  
 
SSR remains an underdeveloped and contested concept among aid agencies and donors. 
The ‘war on terror’ has probably weakened one key SSR element, namely the emphasis 
on governance and civilian oversight. The efforts have instead focused on strengthening 
the capacity of the security institutions, especially the police and the armed forces, often 
in ways similar to traditional military assistance. 
 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs often take place 
immediately following a ceasefire or peace agreement between warring factions. 
Together with issues such as control of small arms and mine clearance, DDR are at the 
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core of SSR and critical in peace building more generally. Ideally, DDR begins with 
disarmament – a process whereby ex-combatants voluntarily hand in their weapons, 
register into a programme and renounce their status as a combatant. Demobilisation 
follows, involving temporary encampment, the provision of food, water and shelter, and 
basic primary health. Ex-combatants are then returned to their home communities where 
they begin to access reintegration assistance, usually skill training for local needs that are 
compatible with the wider development agenda. 
 
Substant ial “DD” programmes have been funded and supported by international and 
national donor agencies and security forces. However, the most difficult dimension has 
often revolved around the neglected “R”.  DDR will only be successful when the ex-
combatants have been effectively reinserted into civilian society. To succeed, such 
programmes must overcome critical economic, social, political and psychological barriers 
to re- insertion.  
 
Some reasonably successful programs have been established. In Timor-Leste the UNDP 
in association with the International Center for Transitional Justice has introduced a re-
integration programme for ex-militia centred on a strengthened national truth and 
reconciliation commission (UNDP/BCPR 2002). In Sierra Leone, 72,500 combatants 
were disarmed and demobilised in the period 1998-2002, and 42,300 weapons and 1.2 
million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed. The program was 
coordinated by the National Commission for DDR and the Economic Community of 
West African State’ Monitoring Group and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. 
During Phase II DDR the  Commission worked with a joint DDR coordination and 
implementation committee comprising all combatant groups, the GOSL, and the UN 
(DFID, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Defence 2003:15).  
 
In some countries, groups with special needs must be addressed by DDR programs (child 
soldiers and female soldiers). Families of ex- combatants will also require support, as 
well as wives of ex-combatants, disabled combatants, and those requiring medical 
screening for HIV/AIDS and other illnesses.    
 
Vertical accountability (as shown in Fig.1) is influenced by a variety of factors, many of 
which are not directly governance related. However, vital interventions in post-war 
contexts focus on the election system, building a civil society and supporting grassroots 
initiatives.   
2.6 Supporting electoral processes 
The objectives of post-war elections  are typically to:  
· move the conflict from the military battleground to the political arena ; 
· transfer power or legitimize the power of a government than can start rebuilding 
the country; and 
· initiate and consolidate the democratization process. 
 
There is increasing awareness that ill-timed, badly designed or poorly run elections can 
undermine both peace and democratization in post-war situations (UNDP 2003b). In fact 
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elections may function as a conflict generating element. Timing of elections is a critical 
determinant of the outcome (as every Prime Minister knows). In post-war situations, 
timing must take into account the degree of continuing conflict in society, as discussed 
above, as well as the willingness and ability of alienated parties to return to the military 
arena. Basic security is a precondition for holding elections that are minimally 
meaningful at all, whether security is provided by foreign peacekeepers or progress 
towards demobilization/ demilitarization of the contending parties (see Annex I).  
 
Political contestation requires a set of minimal prerequisites, such as freedom of 
expression, movement, and organization and existence of political parties that can field 
candidates and mount election campaigns. Some observers claim that these are conditions 
that post-conflict societies tend to lack (Kumar 1999:10). This is true in cases that lack 
Western-style democratic traditions (e.g. Cambodia), or where a post-war military victor 
rules (Rwanda). Elsewhere, as in Central America, the war itself served to heighten 
political consciousness and mobilization; hence, providing one necessary ingredient for 
democratic contestation. 
 
The electoral system has profound impact on representation and governance. The critical 
factor is the electoral formula which determines how votes are translated into seats. In 
post-war situations, the main test is how the system handles challenges of reintegration 
and representation. Experience from ethnically divided societies is relevant here. There is 
broad agreement that simple majority rule is not an effective form of democracy for such 
situations. A system which requires an absolute majority may induce alliances between 
political parties during the electoral campaign, but may create permanent minorities. 
Proportional representation and power sharing techniques which encourage broad-based 
governing coalitions are more appropriate (Barkan 1998; Sisk 1996; Vengroff 1993). 
Power-sharing arrangements can be abused by colluding elites, however, and are most 
successful in managing conflict when: 
 
· they are embraced by a core group of moderate political leaders who are 
genuinely representative of the groups that they purport to lead; 
· the practices are flexible and allow for equitable distribution of resources; 
· they are indigenously arrived at, not agreed upon as the result of excessive 
external pressures or short-term, zero-sum expectations of the parties; and 
· the parties allow a more integrative and liberal form of democracy to evolve. 
 
In post-war situations, as in emerging democracies generally, political parties are critical 
insofar as they structure the competition between societal groups and interests. Some 
observers argue that in situations where one party is dominant, ‘democracy promoters’ 
must encourage the development of alternative political parties, financing included. 
Helping civil society and financing proliferation of NGOs is not enough, ‘political party 
development must be a top agenda item’ (Carothers 2002). The same logic would apply 
to post-war situations that produced clear winners and losers (Rwanda), or that left one 
protagonist in control over the state apparatus and well-positioned in the electoral arena 
(Mozambique).  
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Other observers caution that external funding of political parties is highly problematic. 
Foreign funding may distance the party from the electorate, reduce internal party 
democracy, encourage ‘party entrepreneurs’ to establish parties in order to tap into 
international funds, and can be viewed as foreign attempts to influence national politics. 
Hence, external funding of political parties should not impose (i) a particular party 
platform or (ii) a particular organizational model, and should not produce excessive 
fragmentation of the party system (Mathisen and Svåsand 2002). 
2.7 Promoting civil society organisations 
Many donors support human rights organisations  that build rights awareness on 
grassroots levels (e.g. the Honduran-based CeSHRA program in Central Americas). 
These are often anchored in a national human rights commission, or human rights 
monitoring linked to larger peace commissions (as in Nicaragua). Human rights work on 
the micro- level of this kind has been important (Sørbø, Skaar, and Stokke 2002), yet its 
overall effectiveness is highly dependent upon macro- level support in the form of 
national policy and international assistance. Support for development of human rights 
organizations in Cambodia on both local and national level has, for instance, been 
considered a major success and achievement.  
 
National, institutional support is necessary to establish the principle of no impunity 
through firm prosecution of violations. In the case of refugees returning to conflictual 
post-war situations, both national and international support is required to establish a 
reasonable absence of fear. Fear of reprisals was a main reason why Hutu refugees were 
reluctant to return to Rwanda after the genocide. In Bosnia, it took concerted efforts by 
the international community – including provision of incentives to both refugees and 
local authorities – to encourage returns to areas that had been ‘cleansed’ (Uvin 2000).  
2.8 Grassroots projects: Empowerment, cooperation and dialogue 
Several projects in war-torn societies have been designed to empower victimized and 
traumatized communities. Projects of this kind have been established to assist the 
indigenous people in Guatemala, who suffered enormously from systematic violence 
perpetrated by the ‘security’ forces during the war. One project, for instance, sought to 
strengthen the Mayan people ’s capacity to articulate their interests in policy discussions. 
 
The theory that personal contact reduces hostility – amplified by the conflict 
transformation theories of Lederach (1997) and Kriesberg (1998) – has informed 
numerous projects. The assumption is that participation in common projects and 
structured interaction among previously divided communities will help restore (or 
create) positive social relations.  Cooperative projects of this kind have been particularly 
common in the post-war Balkans. Evaluations of cross-ethnic contact groups of youth and 
NGOs suggest they have been effective but – as in the case of grass-roots human rights 
initiatives – vulnerable to renewed conflict on the national level (Vik 2000; Dyregrov and 
Søfting 2001).  
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Recognizing that peace must be built from below as well as from above, South Africa 
pioneered the use of grass-roots peace committees. Designed to foster tolerance and 
prevent violence on the local level, the committees were linked to a regional-national 
structure. They have since been emulated elsewhere (e.g. Sri Lanka and Nicaragua), and 
are generally considered important in contributing to conflict management in deeply 
divided societies (Kumar 1999:9).     
3. Important cross-cutting issues and challenges 
3.1 Pace, sequencing and portfolio mix of governance interventions 
The pace of reform is critical. The UN and the rest of the international community 
typically want quick results to satisfy organizational demands, to reduce costs (especially 
if UN assessed-cost peace operations are involved) and avoid open-ended commitments, 
and because it is widely accepted that peace dividends in the form of rapid results are 
necessary to sustain the peace process. Most governance measures, however, require a 
long time frame if they are to function as genuine social processes. Relevant cases in 
point are constitution-making and the timing of elections. 
 
Restoring an administrative infrastructure for governing is an immediate task of post-war 
situations. While often low and time-consuming, measures to restore a system of public 
finance, as well as legal and civil administration reform, are early priorities.  
 
The same applies to human rights. Societies emerging from civil war are typically 
traumatized by exceptional violence. Restoration of a modicum of confidence in the 
ability of society to interact in non-violent modes is a precondition for civil governance 
of any kind. Demonstration of a commitment to human rights (against extrajudicial 
killings, torture, disappearances, and respect for habeas corpus) is critical to create this 
kind of confidence. Human rights thus appear as an early and continuous priority 
regardless of which sequence of governance interventions is chosen. In practice, the 
international community has been ambivalent, typically endorsing the establishment of 
national human rights commissions, but not giving high priority to the establishment of 
the rule of law (King’s College London 2003), and letting political considerations 
determine positions on transitional justice (see section on criminal justice procedures 
above). In Afghanistan, for instance, the international community has downgraded the 
importance of both past and present human rights violations in the name of safeguarding 
stability (CMI 2004).  
 
With respect to institutions of accountability, the pace and sequence of interventions are 
more variable. As Figure 1 indicates, accountable, democratic governance can be secured 
by various means, wholly or partly. For instance, if the post-war situation does not 
encourage early elections, other instruments of vertical accountability (e.g. media, civic 
organizations) and instruments of horizontal accountability (official ‘watchdog’ 
commissions, with or without international support) may to some extent compensate. In 
other words, different sequences and portfolio mix of governance interventions may 
produce the desired accountability. 
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3.2 Trust and reconciliation 
Building of ‘trust’ and efforts to generate a sense of ‘reconciliation’ are of central 
concern in post-war contexts. ‘Trust’ is an imprecise concept. The term is used loosely in 
the policy-oriented literature on post-war reconstruction and governance, but has no clear 
or common definition. In a general sense, ‘trust’ can be associated (negatively) with the 
absence of threats of renewed violence and human rights violations, and (positively) with 
confidence in the post-war order. Such confidence, in turn, depends upon a range of 
factors such as legitimacy of the post-war government, the relevance and effectiveness of 
the governance measures introduced, the pace of economic reconstruction, including 
visible signs of broadly distributed peace dividends, and the macro-economic framework 
for peace.  
 
On the micro-level, ‘trust’ is used mostly in connection with community relations, 
particularly efforts to restore or establish positive communication among communities or 
individuals that were previously divided by violence. As noted above, donors have 
supported numerous projects to this effect, such as human rights organizations, 
empowerment efforts, promotion of cooperation among divided communities, and peace 
committees.  
 
Social trust and interethnic cooperation may also be generated as a by-product of rapid 
reconstruction. An analysis of different types of reconstruction projects concluded that 
the cooperation dividend was mixed (Kumar 1999). Micro enterprises and small business 
helped increase family income, but did not generate many opportunities for interethnic 
interaction. Support to larger firms did result in some ethnically blind business ventures, 
with multiethnic staff, board of directors, and customers. The market economy thus had 
an integrative function. Large projects to rehabilitate physical infrastructure contributed 
to the political and economic integration of the region, which in turn was seen as a 
necessary – but not sufficient – condition for interethnic tolerance and trust. 
 
Reconciliation can be understood to take at least three forms. At the ‘thin’ end the parties 
only co-exist peacefully; in a further development they listen and try to understand each 
other in the spirit of democratic reciprocity; and at the ‘thick’ end there is a 
comprehensive reconstruction of social bonds between victims and perpetrators. The last 
phase implies forgiveness and healing (Crocker 2000).   
 
The process of moving towards the ‘thick’ form of reconciliation is ideally seen to entail 
several phases (Adelman 2004): 
 
· recognition of the truth of past violence by giving voice to victims and creating a 
common memory for the future; often done through truth commissions or similar 
public investigations; 
· restorative justice by holding perpetrators accountable, typically through criminal 
justice procedures, and establishing the principle of no impunity in the future; 
· restitution by compensating for past losses and creating institutions for future 
reform to address needs; and 
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· healing, typically through public rituals, which in traditional societies usually 
involves rituals of cleansing  and reconciliation (Babo Soares 2004; Honwana 
2004). 
 
In practice there is no set or necessary sequence. Legal experts typically argue that 
restorative justice is necessary for reconciliation; other experts claim that criminal 
procedures may open old wounds and create new conflict. Since the outcome is difficult 
to measure – how thin or thick is the reconciliation? – the disagreement persists.  
3.3 Ownership 
The principle of national ownership of the political and economic reconstruction process 
is firmly established, widely accepted, and repeatedly invoked as a primary lesson from 
the past (Dabelstein 2002). The problem of implementing it in practice reflects several 
enduring dilemmas: 
 
· Imbalance in capacity and resources between specialized and well- funded 
international agencies and a socie ty whose administrative capacity and resources 
have been depleted by war and often were poorly developed for a start. Most post-
war reconstructions are dependent on heavy international financing. 
· Demand for effective use of resources and quick results and organizational 
interests of aid agencies to be present and demonstrate that their programs are 
effective. These conditions also favour international controls. 
· Tension over policy content: donors and aid agencies typically have political 
agendas that suggest desirable forms of reconstruction. In the governance realm, 
this includes human rights, secularism, and Western forms of democratization. 
These goals may conflict with those pursued by national authorities, in which case 
national ownership typically is sidelined (e.g. in relation to national transitional 
justice procedures in Rwanda and Islamic law in Afghanistan).   
 
Recipient governments can nevertheless aggressively assert their authority over the 
reconstruction program, as demonstrated in Rwanda and Afghanistan. The Afghan 
authorities did so partly by relying heavily international consultant firms and NGOs to 
assist in the administration as well as implementation of aid projects.. While this 
technically speaking preserved national ownership, it raised serious questions of cost, 
dependence and sustainability in the longer run. 
3.4 Coordination  
Coordination in the governance sector is complicated by the fact that several large 
agencies typically are involved in various aspects (UNDP, the World Bank and HCHR), 
as well as other actors in the UN system (IOM in DDR), and numerous NGOs financed 
bilaterally through donors. The presence of a UN assistance mission led by a SRSG adds 
to the complexity. Given the voluntary nature of coordination, and the large number of 
actors in heavily financed post-war programs, the coordination function must have an 
institutional locus. This is sometimes the office of the UNDP Resident Representative, 
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but in complex situations involving a UN mission with an SRSG, the latter may be the 
focal point for coordination. 
 
In Afghanistan, donors and aid agencies acknowledged the importance of having a 
distinct coordination structure that initially was anchored in the office of the deputy 
SRSG. Without budgetary and staffing power over the agencies, however, the SRSG had 
little capacity to integrate the mission, and the IFIs were at any rate outside his formal 
authority (King’s College London 2003).  As a result, coordination followed the usual 
voluntary form. In an innovative move, the formal responsibility for coordination was 
subsequently taken over by the Afghan authorities. The transition was supported by 
donors, UNDP and OCHA (UNDP 2003a). The move reflected in part the aggressive 
position of the Afghan Minister of Finance and his (foreign) advisors. 
 
Strategic coordination – as distinct from tactical coordination of programs – entails the 
streamlining of policy interests of the external actors. In the governance field, a growing 
consensus among the major actors on what constitutes principles of good governance has 
lessened the challenge of strategic coordination. Divisions nevertheless remain. In 
Rwanda, donors were deeply divided over how far it could morally pressure the post-
genocide government on any governance issue, in Afghanistan, donors are divided on 
how far to promote human rights and democracy if it endangers stability, in the Balkans, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan important external actors have diverging interests and 
priorities. The ‘war on terror’ has further divided US and European actors on matters of 
when and how to introduce governance measures in the only two post-9/11 cases so far, 
i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Not only coordination of external actors is required, however. Three levels of 
coordination can be considered of importance: donor-donor (external); donor-
Government; and inter-ministerial (Renner 2004). There has been increasing recognition 
of the principle that the host government must be assisted to take on major coordination 
responsibilities. It has even been suggested that UNDP should only support in-country, 
government- led development forums and not Round Tables and Consultative Groups 
(Renner 2004:2). Only rarely is there insufficient local capacity to build on. The main 
exception is Somalia, where an Aid Coordination Body was established by agreements of 
all major international players and pushed forward by the European Commission’s 
Special Envoy to Somalia. The importance of the ACB reflected the weakness of the 
central state in Somalia (Boyle 2004:6). 
 
The system of departmentally-based consultative groups to coordinate activities in the 
various program areas has functioned unevenly. Much depends upon the leadership of 
individual consultative groups. Some donors, moreover, do not observe the rules 
established by the Ministry of Finance to declare their activities in the relevant program 
areas, and to concentrate on a certain number of program areas. Nevertheless, the 
framework seems promising (CMI 2004). In both Afghanistan and Cambodia, the 
national development framework or equivalent plan document has been used with 
reasonably good results as a strategic instrument for alignment of development assistance 
(Silovic 2004:8).  
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There are no set formulas for where the central aid coordination or management 
mechanism should be located, although basing it close to the poverty 
monitoring/development policy unit – often in the Finance Ministry or the equivalent – 
seems useful (Renner 2004). In Bosnia, the coordination of development assistance is 
shared between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and the 
Directorate for European Integration.  
 
While often overlooked by external aid actors, inter-ministerial coordination in the 
recipient country is also critical. In Bosnia, UNDP launched a project that among other 
things aimed at “institutionalising communication among Government structures on 
needs, priorities and gaps in an integrated manner” (Renner 2004:2). Similarly, an overall 
objective of the Serbian Aid Coordination Unit is to increase the capacity of line 
ministries in order to support the aid and development coordination process.  
4. Conclusions 
In conclusion it must be recalled that governance is a process, not a product. This calls 
for a long-term perspective and a recognition that social engineering has distinct limits. 
External actors in particular need to be conscious of the dilemmas of ownership and 
assistance that operate in post-war situations. While working in a policy framework that 
emphasizes the principles of democracy – which entails local self-determination and 
ownership – aid actors have their own interests and procedures that may well conflict 
with local needs and interests. The imbalance in capacity and resources nevertheless 
gives the aid actors a dominant voice in the formulation of goals and policies, often 
leaving conflicts to be ‘solved’ on the ground through local non-compliance or resistance, 
or producing dysfunctional social consequences. The dilemma is inherent in all aid 
activities, but is accentuated by the sharp imbalance in resources and administrative 
capacity that typically exist in a post-war situation. 
 
The other main conclusions of this report are: 
 
· aid actors need to adjust policies to local types of post-war situations. A one-size 
policy does not fit all cases; 
· promoting human rights is a confidence-building measure, and as such is essential 
to establishing a foundation for post-war, democratic governance; 
· accountability measures are necessary to secure democratic governance, but there 
are many forms and structures of accountability. There is no obviously ideal 
package or sequence; 
· decentralization has obvious advantages in post-war situations where the  central 
state is weak or remains contested, but must be balanced by a national structure 
· aid coordination based in host government institutions can be an effective and 
sustainable approach; and 
· approaching security issues through non-conventional entry points can encourage 
critical reforms in a difficult sector. 
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Annex 1:  A Path to Peace? Post-Conflict Elections 1992-2002  
(AREU 2003) 
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Annex 2: Truth commissions, judicial settlement, or both?  
(Skaar 2004) 
 
SPONSOR TRUTH  COMMISSION 
(TC) 
JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT 
BOTH PLANNED TC 
NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 
The Philippines  (1986) 
Uganda (1986) 
Chad (1991) 
Chile (1990) 
Nepal (1990) 
Sri Lanka (1994) 
Haiti (1995) 
South Africa (1995) 
Ecuador (1996) 
Ghana (2003) 
Nigeria (1999) 
Greece (1975-76) 
Rwanda (1994-) 
Malawi (1995) 
 
 
Bolivia (1982)/(86-93) 
Argentina (1983)/(1985) 
GDR (1992-)/ 1992-) 
 
Ethiopia (1992)/(1994-) 
Sierra Leone (2002/2002) 
East Timor 
South Korea 
Honduras 
Colombia 
Bosnia 
Indonesia 
Cambodia 
 
NATIONAL/ 
INTERNATIONAL NGO 
Brazil (1985) 
Uruguay (1985) 
El Salvador 1992) 
Burundi (1995) 
Guatemala (1997) 
Yugoslavia (1994-) 
 
Rwanda (1993)/(1994-) 
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Summary 
This report addresses governance issues in post-war situations as 
these are dealt with in three sets of literature:  
· the growing case-based knowledge arising from the 
experience in internationally-assisted transitions from 
war to peace since the early 1990s. 
· insofar as these transitions typically intended to establish 
a democratic post-war order, important insights can be 
drawn from the more general literature on democratic 
transitions.  
· there is increasing evidence that the direction of 
developments in the post-war phase in important ways is 
shaped not only by the conflict itself, but by the nature of 
the peace settlement and the international commitment to 
the agreement and its implementation As a result, the 
context of political and economic reconstruction will 
vary significantly. 
The report outlines the key institutional components of the 
relationship between a post-war context and the implementation 
of a democratic system of governance. 
After noting the importance of differentiating between 
types of post-war situations, the report reviews experiences from 
what is considered to be the most critical governance 
interventions. These include constitution-making and 
constitutional design; establishment of watchdog institutions; 
truth commissions and criminal justice procedures; local 
governance; security sector reform; elections, forming of electoral 
systems and political parties; supporting human rights 
organisations; empowerment projects, and cooperation among 
divided communities and peace committees. 
Lastly, major cross-cutting issues are considered, such as 
pace, sequencing and portfolio mix of governance interventions, 
building trust and generating reconciliation, and coordination of 
external actors. 
This report was originally prepared for the seminar 
Governance in Post-Conflict Situations organised by UNDP and 
Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, 5-7 May 2004.  
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